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Foreword 
 
The David Hume Institute was delighted to hold a seminar on the implications of 
population ageing in the Autumn of 2008.  We have to thank HBOS for their generous 
sponsorship allowing Prof John Ermisch, a world-renowned expert on this area, to 
present a paper at the Royal Society of Edinburgh.  To bring into greater focus the 
Scottish data an additional paper was prepared by Prof Robert Wright and Katerina 
Lisenkova of Strathclyde University and funded by the ESRC. 
 
Prof Ermisch provides an overview of demographic trends including data covering 
not only declining mortality and fertility rates, but also changes in family formation 
and composition.  His analysis of the impact of an ageing population goes beyond 
thinking about how a proportionately smaller working age population supports others 
dependant upon it.  Turning to less frequently explored territory he reflects on the 
implications of a changing age structure on investment in human capital and the 
housing market. 
 
The proportion of people of working age (20-64) to those aged 65 and over falls from 
3.7 ‘worker’ per ‘pensioner’ in 2006 to 2.5 in 2031.  Among those aged 65 and over 
the percentage aged 80 and over increases from 28% to 34% in the same period. 
Ermisch suggests that private savings, private pensions and occupational pensions are 
unlikely to be sufficient to meet the needs of a larger retired population.  
Consequently state pensions will be an important part of retirement income in the 
future.  To keep state pensions in line with earnings National Insurance Contributions 
need to be increased by a third, yet the sustainability and equity of increases of this 
order needs consideration.  In terms of sustainability the increased cost burden an 
older population implies for the state creates a great uncertainly of what will be 
affordable in the future.  In terms of equity, the need to transfer more income from the 
working population through higher taxation places an increased burden on future 
generations. Generational accounting suggests that to keep the tax burden the same 
for future and current generations (adjusting for growth) requires immediate and 
permanent tax increases of 6 per cent at the very least.   
 
Ermisch’s discussion ranges to the impacts of an ageing population on investment in 
human capital.  His conclusion that changing family formation patterns lead to less 
efficient expenditure on children must raise serious concern, especially when it is that 
generation which will bear the burden of supporting a larger older population.  In the 
housing market too, Ermisch tackles a less expected consequence of changing 
demographics.  Changes in household formation patterns are likely to increase the 
rates at which people move home putting upward pressure on house prices.  Ermisch’s 
paper takes us beyond the more familiar consequences of population ageing such as 
the difficulties of adequate pension provision and points out significant impacts in 
other fields.  This helpfully shows the complex and all-encompassing effects of 
demographic change and indicates how our thinking on the policy impacts of ageing 
can be usefully broadened out. 
 
Lisenkova and Wright supplement Ermisch’s paper with data focusing particularly on 
Scotland.  The data suggest that population decline is further advanced here than 
south of the border. Their discussion of policy implications notes that while not all 
effects of population decline are negative, the negative impacts of a declining labour 
force have clear negative macroeconomic consequences: reducing competitiveness 
and output while increasing inflation. They suggest increased net migration, 
increasing women’s labour market participation, and increasing productivity as policy 
responses that could mitigate population ageing and its effects. The paper ends by 
sketching out the dilemma posed by demographic decline: as populations age costs 
increase yet the ability of an economy to meet those costs is likely to decline as well.   
 
There is no simple answer but this dilemma needs to be brought further into the 
debate regarding Scotland’s economic future. We hope these papers and the 5th 
November seminar will help to that end. 
 
I should end by noting that the David Hume Institute has no collective view on the 
contents of these papers or of the policy implications. 
 
Sarah Kyambi 
(Deputy Director) 
 
February 2009 
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Population Ageing: Crisis or Opportunity? 
 
John Ermisch 
 
This seminar represents a milestone for me. I published my first book 25 years ago on the 
topic of this seminar: the political economy of demographic change, particularly the economic 
implications of changes in the population’s age distribution (Ermisch 1983). I welcome the 
opportunity to return to this subject. But there are, of course, more important milestones in the 
study of this subject: Keynes’ (1937) short pamphlet and Reddaway’s book (1939) on the 
economic consequences of a declining population, followed by the deliberations of the Royal 
Commission on Population, which was set up in 1944, but did not report until 1949. 
 
In looking forward over the first three to five decades of this century, we should be cautious 
about the inferences that can be drawn from the prospective demographic changes because the 
economies and societies that will exist in 2030 and beyond may be very different from 
today’s (independent of the demographic changes). Could any of the experts involved with 
the Royal Commission have imagined what today’s society would be like, or even 1980’s 
society? The National Health Service had only just begun when they reported, and the new 
welfare system based on Beveridge’s ideas had just started. In terms of demographic change 
itself, the Commission was concerned about the impacts of declining fertility in the 1920s and 
1930s, but the fertility rate had already risen during the war, and six years after the 
Commission reported it was to begin a sustained rise to levels not reached since the beginning 
of the 20th century.  
 
That is not to say that the exercise in this paper - assessing the implications of demographic 
changes on the assumption that society does not change dramatically - is pointless; only that it 
should be strongly qualified by uncertainty. There may be clues to how society will change in 
the prospective changes in the population, and a starting point for assessing their implication 
must be today’s society and institutions. We should, however, remain sceptical of particular 
scenarios that may suggest themselves from today’s perspective, focussing instead on 
developing policies and institutions that have the ability to react to events rather than relying 
on the ability to predict them. Flexibility should be our guiding principle when dealing with 
the uncertainty that we face. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the changes in the distribution of 
life expectancy over the past 30 years as a consequence of declining mortality. This is 
followed by a discussion of how the patterns of family formation and dissolution have 
changed over the same period and their relation to changes in fertility and the composition of 
families. In the third section, the consequences of past and projected changes in mortality, 
fertility and migration for key aspects of the age distribution of the population are presented. 
The fourth section is a core part of the paper. It discusses the economics of supporting an 
ageing population. The next section discusses the challenges for investment in children 
produced by changes in family formation and dissolution patterns, and the following section 
analyses the implications of ageing and family formation patterns for the housing market. The 
final section presents the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
1. Declining mortality 
The most obvious way that the age distribution of the population shifts toward older ages is 
people living longer. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in mortality in Great Britain for each sex 
by plotting the number per 100,000 births surviving at each age in two English ‘life-tables’, 
one based on mortality rates in 1980-82 and the other based on mortality rates in 2004-2006.  
2 
Such life-tables indicate the proportion of people surviving at each age if the age-specific 
mortality rates in the particular years were experienced by a new born through his or her life. 
It shows for example that at 2004- 06 mortality rates, 80% of women would survive to their 
73rd birthday compared with  only 70% for those experiencing the mortality rates of 25 years 
earlier, or putting it somewhat differently, 80% only make it to their 68th birthday at the 
mortality rates of 1980-82. It also evident from the overlapping survival curves in Figure 1 
that men’s 2004-2006 mortality experience only achieves the survival rates of women 25 
years earlier. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 indicates that improvements in the chances of surviving are particularly large at ages 
above 60. Figure 2 presents these same data in another way. It shows the gains in the 
expectation of remaining life between these two life-tables at birth, age 60 and age 70 for each 
sex. Men have clearly made larger gains at each age than women. For example, their 
remaining life expectancy at age 60 has increased by 4.5 years compared with 3.2 years for 
women. As Figure 1 showed, women still live much longer on average. According to the 
2004-06 life-table, women can expect to live 24 more years at age 60 compared to 21 more 
years for men. At birth, their respective life expectancies are 81.3 and 76.9 years.  
 
 
Figure 1: Proportion Surviving:  Comparing 1980-82 and 2004-2006 Lifetables by Sex
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These reductions in mortality at ages above 60 clearly increase the older population relative to 
the entire population, as we shall illustrate later with projections of the population by age. 
Over the long term, e.g. 1875-1940, declining fertility made a larger contribution to the 
ageing of the population than reductions in mortality. But the fertility fluctuations in the past, 
illustrated in Figure 3, have produced bulges and hollows in the age distribution, and the baby 
boom of 1955-70 will soon produce a large increase in the population aged 65 and over. The 
next section examines fertility in the context of the new dynamics of family formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: General Fertility Rate (per 1000 women aged 15-44), 
England and Wales
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Figure 2: Gains in Expectation of Remaining Life, Comparing 1980-82 and 2004-06 Lifetables
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2. New dynamics of family formation 
 
The ‘total fertility rate’ (TFR) measures the number of children women would have during 
their life if they experienced the current year’s age-specific fertility rates throughout their 
childbearing years. Changes in the English and Scottish TFRs over the last 36 years are 
shown in Figure 4. There was a cross-over point in the early 1980s when Scottish fertility fell 
below English fertility, but since the late 1980s their TFRs have moved in parallel, including 
a significant rise since 2002. In what follows I consider Great Britain as a whole, as what I 
say applies to all three constituent countries. In order to put these fertility changes in the 
broader context of family formation patterns, I compare women born in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s.1 The first group were making their important family formation decisions in the 1970s, 
and the last in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
In Britain, live-in partnerships, be they formal marriage or not, have been forming later in 
people’s lives. For instance, comparing women born in the 1950s with those born in the 
1970s, the age by which one-half had their first live-in partnership increased from 22 to 25. 
Another big change over the last quarter of the twentieth century is that in the new 
millennium the vast majority of partnerships now begin as informal, cohabiting unions. These 
unions rose as a proportion of first partnerships from about one-quarter for women born in the 
1950s to over four-fifths for women born in the 1970s. These two changes lie behind the large 
postponement of marriage and motherhood in women’s lives. Cohabiting unions have a high 
dissolution rate, and it has increased over time: now one-half of the cohabiting unions 
eventually dissolve, with the other half turning into marriage. Divorce also became more 
common for successive cohorts born from 1926 to 1961. 
 
 
                                               
1
 I use fertility and partnership histories derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) by linking respondents’ 
retrospective histories with their partnership and fertility experience during the panel, 1991-2005. This provides information 
on a range of post-war birth cohorts. See Ermisch (2006) for further details of the statistics in this section. 
Figure 4: Total Fertility Rate, England and Scotland
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Investigation of the social differentiation of family formation patterns, say by education level 
or family background, improves our understanding of the causes and consequences of 
changes in these patterns.  
Here we compare women whose highest qualification (by 2005 or the last time they were 
observed in the panel) is at most GCSE/O-level (or its Scottish equivalent), which is usually 
obtained by the age of 16 or 17, with those with a higher qualification than that, denoting 
these as ‘less’ and ‘more’ educated women, respectively.2 
 
There was much greater postponement of first live-in partnership for more educated women. 
Among the 1970s cohorts, less educated women partner, on average, 2 years earlier than more 
education women (median age of 24 cf. 26). More educated women also were pioneers in 
adopting cohabitation as the form of their first union, but by the 1970s cohorts there was little 
difference by educational attainment.  
 
Despite the fact that age at first union is later for more educated women born in the 1970s, 
their median age at marriage was about the same as that for less educated women. This is 
because less educated women are more likely to dissolve their first cohabiting union (rather 
than marry their partner) than more educated women. It takes time to form a new union after 
dissolution; it will usually be a cohabiting union; and time will elapse before the couple 
marry, if they do so. All of this lengthens the time to first marriage. 
 
Marriage was postponed more than childbearing for less educated women: among women 
born in the 1970s, the difference in median ages of marriage (32) and motherhood (26) was 6 
years for less educated women.3 This implies a rise in childbearing outside marriage, and 
there has indeed been an explosion of non-marital childbearing after at least 130 years of 
stability, rising from 9% of all births in 1975 to 44% in 2006: Figure 5 shows the figures for 
England and Wales. Since 1995, the percentage of births outside marriage has risen even 
faster in Scotland, reaching 48% in 2006. In part this difference reflects a different ethnic 
composition of births between the two countries: in 2006, 22% of births in England and 
Wales were to mothers born outside the UK. When we restrict ourselves to women born in the 
UK, 49% of English/Welsh births in 2006 were outside marriage, similar to Scotland.  
 
                                               
2
 There is no presumption that differences in educational attainment ‘caused’ the family formation 
differences that we observe; education is only used a convenient grouping variable, reflecting many 
differences in women’s family background and individual orientation and lifestyles. It is also 
associated with other socio-economic indicators. 
3
 For more educated women born in the 1970s, the median age of first birth was slightly larger than the 
median age at first marriage. 
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How many of these births outside marriage are to cohabiting couples? We can use the birth 
registration data to estimate the proportion. Births to cohabiting couples are identified as those 
in which the parents jointly register the birth and the parents live at the same address, and the 
remaining births outside marriage are assumed to be to women on their own.4 Between 1983 
and 2005 in England and Wales, there was a relatively steady upward trend in the percentage 
of all births to cohabiting couples according to this definition: it rose from 7% to 27%. 
Expressed as a percentage of births outside marriage, births to cohabiting couples rose from 
48% in 1983 to 64% in 2002, since which time it has stabilised. As the earlier comparison of 
median ages of marriage and motherhood suggest, birth rates outside marriage, either in a 
cohabiting union or outside a live-in partnership altogether, have risen more for less educated 
women.5 
 
Cohabiting unions have a high dissolution rate, and, as Figure 6 shows, it has increased over 
time, with increase being larger for less educated women. In contrast to earlier cohorts, 
among women born in 1970s, less educated women are more likely to dissolve their unions 
than more educated ones. Also, among those born since 1960 less educated women have a 
divorce rate 30% higher than that of more educated women. 
 
                                               
4
 That is, those registered only by the mother or by both parents, but who give different addresses. 
5
 Among women born in the 1950s, less educated women had a cohabiting union first birth rate 1.8 times higher than that of 
more educated women, and this rose to 2.8 times higher among born in the 1970s. The corresponding ratios for the birth rate 
outside a live-in partnership were 2.2 and 4.8. 
Figure 5: Births Outside Marriage per 1000 Live Births, 
England and Wales
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Thus, fertility decisions are now made in an environment of considerable partnership 
instability. While the majority of births outside marriage are born to parents living together, 
these unions are not very stable (about one-half dissolve), and also in excess of 40% of 
marriages eventually dissolve. Focussing on unions with children, I estimate that 30% of 
children born within marriage will not live their entire childhood (to their 16th birthday) with 
both natural parents, and this percentage rises to 65% of children born into a cohabiting 
union. Furthermore, over one-third of births outside marriage are to parents who did not live 
together, at least at the time of birth registration. 
 
While divorce remains the primary way that lone parent families are formed, the sharp rise in 
childbearing within cohabiting unions also made an important contribution to the increase in 
lone parenthood, because of the high dissolution rate of cohabiting unions and because the 
‘conversion to marriage’ rate is lower for mothers than childless women in cohabiting unions. 
The patterns discussed above imply ‘social selection’ into lone parenthood: less educated 
women are more likely to (1) have a child outside of a live-in partnership; (2) have a child 
within a cohabiting union; (3) dissolve a cohabiting union; and (4) dissolve a marriage. Thus, 
lone mothers are disproportionately among less educated women. 
 
Later in the paper we shall discuss implications of these family formation and dissolution 
patterns for investment in children’s human capital and for the composition of households. 
The next section discusses projections of the population over the next two decades, which 
primarily reflect past changes in fertility and projections about future improvements in life 
expectancy, but also net immigration to the UK. 
 
 
3. Population projections to 2031 
 
In discussing these projections, I focus on people aged 20 and over because, at least up to 
2028, these people have already been born, although they may not be currently in this 
country—see below. As Figure 3 showed, there have been considerable fluctuations in 
fertility in the past, and recent years have seen a significant rise in fertility.  
 
Figure 6: Percentage Dissolving their First Cohabiting Union by 
Educational Attainment and Cohort
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Since 2001, the fertility rate (births per 1000 women) in England and Wales has risen in every 
five-year age group but teenagers, reflecting a rise in both the inside-marriage (per 1000 
married women) and outside marriage rates (per 1000 unmarried women) for every age group 
other than teenagers. Because the proportions that are unmarried have also risen in every age 
group, continuing an upward trend since the early 1970s, there has been an upward trend in 
the percentage of births outside marriage in every age group, particularly among women aged 
under 30, but also for those aged 30-39. It is, therefore, possible that we may experience 
higher fertility than assumed in the projections, with more of it occurring outside marriage. 
 
The Government Actuary Department’s (GAD) 2006-based principal projection assumes that, 
for England and Wales, the long-term average completed family size will be 1.85 children per 
woman (cf. 1.86 in 2006). A lower level of 1.65 is assumed for Scotland. In the shorter-term, 
the projections assume that the total fertility continues to increase until 2010 and then to fall 
slightly; that is, total fertility rates in the first few years of the projections are above those 
assumed for the long term. Assumed improvements in mortality rates after 2006-07 are based 
on trends. 
 
International migration is even more difficult to forecast accurately than fertility, depending 
on economic and political developments abroad as well as in the UK. The GAD assumes that 
net migration into the UK will be 190,000 per annum from 2014 onwards. Over the period 
2007-12, there is an allowance for additional net migration to the UK from the accession 
countries which joined the European Union in May 2004 and January 2007. The average 
annual level of total net immigration to the United Kingdom assumed for this period is around 
215,000. This is similar to that actually experienced during 2004-06, the two years following 
the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, but a little above the assumption of 195,000 for 
2006-07. 
 
These assumptions produce a projected increase in what I shall call the ‘working 
population’—persons aged 20-64—of 3 million between 2006 and 2031, with one-half of that 
being between 2006 and 2012, reflecting the short-term international migration assumptions 
(these assumptions particularly affect the working population because of the age distribution 
of migrants). Dividing the working population by the number of people aged 65 and over 
gives what I call the ‘aged support ratio’. Figure 7 shows that it falls from 3.7 ‘workers’ per 
‘pensioner’ in 2006 to 2.5 in 2031.6 The assumptions about migration play an important role 
in these calculations. Taking the extreme of zero net migration into the UK, the UK working 
population would fall by 2 million between 2006 and 2031, and as Figure 7 shows, the aged 
support ratio falls to 2.1 by 2031. 
 
                                               
6
 It is projected to fall further in the 25 subsequent years, to 2.1, under the long-term fertility and 
migration assumptions. 
9 
 
 
 
Future developments in the population age structure like those in Figure 7 are common across 
Europe; indeed, Britain is a relatively ‘good case’. The implications of low fertility and 
improvement in mortality for the age structure of European populations are examined using 
the 2005-based UN ‘medium’ population projection (2006 Revision). Because it assumes a 
recovery in European fertility, converging to 1.85 children per woman by 2050, this 
projection may be considered relatively optimistic in terms of population ageing and decline. 
Despite this, the aged support ratio declines throughout Europe, reflecting the dramatic 
increase in the retired population (65 and over) everywhere. Figure 8 illustrates the decline for 
some major developed countries. By 2030, this ratio is around 2 workers per pensioner in 
Germany and Italy, below 2 in Japan. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Aged Support Ratio
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Figure 9 shows the number of British people in three key age ranges. Persons aged 20-24 are 
important for new household formation (as well as new labour force entry of graduates), and 
those aged 25-29 are important for first house purchase. In both of these series you see the 
echo of earlier fertility waves (and assumed immigration), with the number of 20-24 year olds 
rising, peaking in 2012 and then declining, and the rise is prolonged for 5 years for 25-29 year 
olds (peaking in 2017). The number of ‘very old’ (aged 80 and over) rises at an increasing 
rate, the increase totalling 2.6 million over the projection period to 2031. As a proportion of 
the population aged 65 and over, the very old increase from 28% (2006) to 34% in 2031. 
 
 
The remaining sections explore the economic implications of these projected changes. I will 
focus on supporting a retired population, investment in children and housing market impacts, 
ignoring implications for the labour market except through the effect of fiscal pressures 
arising from an ageing population. 
 
 
4. Supporting an ageing population 
 
Somehow output must be transferred from those producing it to the retired population, who 
are only consuming it: either through transfers within the family, retirees’ private claims to 
the production of others (returns on capital, including funded pensions) or through 
government transfers paid by current taxes (unfunded pensions). The decline in the aged 
support ratio shown in Figure 7 means that there are fewer producers to make these transfers 
in the coming years. To what extent does that matter? 
 
Family transfers 
Affection, love and altruism toward parents could motivate transfers from adult children to 
parents, thereby internalising support for retirees within the family. But Richard Smith (1996) 
suggests that there is not compelling evidence from English history, going back to Medieval 
times, that people assumed automatic responsibility for their elderly parents.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Persons of Key Ages, Great Brtain
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He believes that it: 
‘seems possible to argue with conviction that reciprocal exchange on the basis of 
mutual advantage is the essence of support between kin, making the family a group 
whose relationships are founded on material considerations and not solely glued 
together by what Janet Finch calls “moral imperatives and ties of affection” (p.44). 
 
In the spirit of David Hume’s ‘human conventions’, there might, however, be a ‘social 
contract’ involving reciprocal intergenerational exchange over the life cycle that is motivated 
by selfish material considerations, such that everyone is better off by obeying it. In particular, 
there could be an extended family network of transfers of money and ‘services’ covering three 
generations at different stages of life (Cigno 1993, 2000). Such a ‘family constitution’ 
arranges transfers to its young members (children) from its middle-aged ones and enforces 
‘repayment’ later when the young ‘borrowers’ have become middle-aged and the middle-aged 
have become old. It specifies the minimum amount of money and services that each middle-
aged adult transfers to her children and the minimum amounts she must transfer to her parent, 
subject to the provision that a person will receive nothing when she is old if she did not 
transfer the prescribed amounts to her parents when she was middle-aged. It is a self-
enforcing family constitution in the sense that it is in the best interests of every family 
member to obey it and to have it obeyed.7 The self-enforcing family constitution is therefore a 
type of social contract which, using David Hume’s metaphor, holds together like a dry stone 
wall. 
 
Extra-family institutions that support elderly parents, like the old Poor Laws or the current 
welfare state, discourage intra-family financial transfers but may promote substitution by 
adult children of non-financial support (i.e. help) for financial support. This may account for 
the fact that in the 17th-18th centuries it was not uncommon for elderly parents to be receiving 
Poor Law support while their children lived in the same parish (Smith 1996), and it may 
account for the low level of financial transfers from adult children to parents in modern 
British society: only about 5% of parents receive regular or frequent financial help from 
children (Ermisch 2008). 
 
Private saving 
In the absence of an important role for the family in supporting transfers of resources to 
retired people, it is left to the market and the state to adjust these intergenerational transfers to 
a new demographic situation. Starting from a theoretical standpoint, compare two closed 
steady-state economies with different population growth rates, each made up of forward-
looking people who maximize their lifetime well-being.8 People would save more in the one 
in which population growth is slower and the aged support ratio is lower, thereby providing 
more capital (including human capital) to each member of the working population, which 
increases their real wages. They would have higher discounted lifetime consumption, made 
possible by more capital per worker and a lesser need to equip new workers with capital. A 
lower aged support ratio (slower population growth) presents no problems in this world, only 
opportunities. 
 
                                               
 
7
 Binmore (2005, p.87) suggests a similar intergenerational contract that can be sustained by selfish people. The 
minimum transfer to parents could be interpreted as adult children’s ‘moral duty’, which is 
fulfilled because the constitution is self-enforcing 
8
 In comparing the two economies, we can assume that the interest rate in the respective economics are 
at the ‘golden rule’ rate that maximises steady-state lifetime well being (equal to the population growth rate), 
because Samuelson (1975) shows that there is always a combination pay-as-you-go, funded pension scheme that 
can achieve the ‘golden rule’ interest rate. 
 
 
12 
This is a steady-state comparison for an economy with forward-looking consumers. In reality, 
Britain and other countries have experienced large past fluctuations in fertility (Figure 3) and 
a downward trend in mortality, and not all (or even most) people are so farsighted. In light of 
the latter, you could view the UK and other countries’ pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
systems as helping to offset the effect of some people’s life cycle planning myopia on their 
income in retirement. Within the PAYG system, real pension benefits can be maintained in 
the face of the decline in the aged support ratio (working population per pensioner) without 
increasing the national insurance (NI) contribution rate if there is compensating growth in the 
real wages of the working population. For instance, in Figure 7, the aged support ratio falls by 
one-third between 2006 and 2031; if real wages grow by one-third in this 25-year period, 
which is likely, then real pension benefits can be maintained without changing the 
contribution rate. This is consistent with the Government Actuary’s Quinquennial Review 
Update (GAD 2005), which projects a fall in the (employer +employee) NI contribution rate 
from 19.3% in 2004-05 to 17.7% in 2030-31 when there is price up-rating of flat rate benefit 
rates and earnings limits and real earnings grow at 2% per annum. 
 
But price up-rating entails that pensioners do not share in the increase in the working 
population’s standard of living. With 2% per annum real earnings growth, the ratio of 
pensions to wages falls by nearly 40% in 25 years. For example, the UK basic (flat-rate) 
pension would fall from 19% of median weekly earnings of full-time workers in 2007 to 12% 
in 2031. 
 
It is possible that today’s older workers are anticipating lower state pensions relative to 
earnings and are saving more to compensate. There is, however, little evidence of this yet. For 
example, the 2002 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) measures the net financial 
wealth (financial assets less debts other than mortgages) of the family unit in which a person 
lived (before the more recent rise in household indebtedness). Focussing on people aged 55-
59 (on the brink of retirement), three-fourths off them had net financial wealth less than 
£57,300 (Marmot et al (2003), Table 3A.7). One-half had less than £17,000 and one quarter 
had less than £1,500, with nearly one-fifth having no net wealth. These amounts are hardly 
the nest-eggs needed for retirement. Furthermore, recent events in financial markets have 
underlined the uncertain value of financial wealth around the time of a person’s retirement.9 
 
What about occupational or private pensions? While most men have been members of an 
employer’s pension scheme sometime during their working, this is not true of women (e.g. in 
2002, about 35% of women aged 55-59 have never contributed to a private pension scheme 
compared to 11% of men of that age (Marmot et al (2003), Table 4A.16). Even those who 
contributed may have limited entitlements because of changes in their employers over their 
working life. Just after retirement, only about 30% of family income came from private 
pensions in 2002 (e.g. for people aged 65-69; Marmot et al (2003), Table 3A.1). Even with a 
good contribution record, funded Defined Contribution pension schemes present uncertainty 
about the value of assets at the time of retirement similar to direct private saving, as recent 
events have shown. Defined Benefit (‘final salary’) pension schemes are not risk-free for 
pensioners either, and they are challenged by population ageing as well, as the number of 
recipients rises relative to contributors and recipients live longer.  
 
Statistics from the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) indicate that, in aggregate, these schemes 
currently have a large deficit (discounted future pension liabilities exceed assets), with four 
fifths of schemes being in deficit at the end of September 2008.  
                                               
9
 Of course, this ignores net housing wealth (house value less mortgage debt). Adding this to net 
financial wealth, three-fourths of people aged 55-59 have less than £203,900 in net wealth including housing 
(one-half less than £100,000; one-quarter less than £37,500; (Marmot et al, Table 3A.10). 
These are amounts do not provide for very large annuities for retirement from equity release schemes. 
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Such deficits put upward pressure on contribution rates, both directly and indirectly through a 
higher risk-based levy to the PPF, and create major problems if the scheme is wound up or 
fails. Taxpayers may have to foot the bill if the PPF runs out of money through the failure of 
schemes, and members who have not yet retired would also suffer because the PPF only pays 
90% of promised pensions and there is a pension ceiling. In sum, private solutions to 
supporting a larger retired population may not be robust. 
 
State pensions 
The analysis of the previous section suggests that for a large proportion of British people 
retiring in the coming decades the state pension will be an important part of their retirement 
income. Suppose, therefore, that state pensions are increased proportionately with earnings 
(i.e. pensioners’ relative income is held constant) so that pensioners can share in increases in 
the population’s standard of living. Then the NI contribution rate would need to rise by one-
third. This simple calculation is very close to that of the Government Actuary’s when there is 
earnings up-rating of flat rate benefit rates and earnings limits. He projects that the NI 
contribution rate would need to rise to 25.4% in 2030-31 compared with 19.3% in 2004-05, 
an increase of 32% (GAD 2005). Two considerations need to be taken into account in 
assessing policy options regarding state pensions. 
 
First, it is important to consider the uncertainty surrounding future demographic 
developments as well as the broad tendencies suggested by population projections. Lee and 
Anderson (2004) address this issue in the context of the U.S. Social Security pension scheme. 
They characterise the uncertainty in terms of the probability distribution of the hypothetical 
immediate and permanent tax increase needed to balance the system over the very long run. 
For instance, they estimate this tax increase to be between 1.3% and 10.5% (of the present 
value of payroll) with 95% probability—a wide range.10 As they stress, this understates the 
uncertainty involved because they incorporate into the forecasts ‘only uncertainty that arises 
within the context of assumed structural continuity and homogeneity.’ Random variations 
about expected values (e.g. wage growth and fertility) occur, but the expected values 
themselves are assumed to be constant. Their main conclusion from their stochastic 
simulations is the importance of formulating adaptable or self-correcting policies for 
addressing the long run imbalance. 
 
Second, we need to consider whether future rises in state pension contribution rates can be 
sustained, as well as the equity of such rises. In doing so we must recognise that future 
pension liabilities under the state pension system represent just part of the future generations’ 
fiscal liabilities. There is, for example, the existing national debt, although this is dwarfed by 
future pension liabilities and also, but less easy to quantify, other future government 
expenditure, for example on health care, which is likely to grow substantially because of the 
large increase in the population aged over 80 (Figure 9). It is hard to quantify what the 
implicit promises of the National Health Service are for the future, but whatever they are they 
need to be paid by the working population at that time. 
 
 
Generational accounting 
‘Generational accounting’ is a way to addresses these issues associated with the government’s 
inter-temporal budget constraint. Generational accounts are defined as the present value of 
taxes paid minus transfer payments received (net taxes) that individuals of different age 
cohorts are expected, under current policy, to pay over their remaining lifetimes. Cardarelli et 
al (2000) have constructed generational accounts looking forward from 1996.  
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 They also show how finite horizons in pension finance forecasts can be misleading, and use a 500- 
year stochastic projection, effectively infinite with discounting, to mimic an infinite horizon forecast. 
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Their ‘baseline policy’ assumes that all transfer payments (including pensions) are price 
indexed, while all other receipts and expenditures per beneficiary are assumed to grow with 
productivity (real wages) at 1.75% per annum. Clearly, many other assumptions must be 
made in order to look well into the future, but indexing is an important policy parameter. 
Under the baseline scenario, government spending on personal transfers declines dramatically 
as a percentage of GDP, despite the ageing of the population. An alternative scenario indexes 
pensions and other social benefits with wages, and allows for an increase in health care 
expenditure to rise to the European average (as a percentage of GDP) by 2005—a rise which 
was in fact achieved.11 
 
They calculate that under the baseline policy an immediate and permanent increase in income 
taxes of 6% (equivalent to a 2p in the basic tax rate) is needed to achieve inter-temporal 
budget balance, and a slightly larger income tax increase (8%) is needed to produce 
‘generational balance’—‘a situation in which future generations face the same fiscal burden, 
as do current generations when adjusted for growth (i.e. when measured as a proportion of 
their lifetime earnings)’ (Cardarelli et al 2000; p. F548). Should, however, all benefits 
increase with earnings and there is the additional health care expenditure per beneficiary 
assumed above, inter-temporal budget (and generational) balance would require an immediate 
and permanent increase in income taxes of 32% and NI contributions would also have to 
increase by 46% to cover the cost of the increase in contributory benefits.12 Failure to increase 
income taxes today puts a considerable burden on future generations, experienced through 
either higher taxes, smaller transfer receipts or less expenditure on these generations. By 
affecting net incomes, higher taxes and NI contributions are likely to influence people’s 
saving behaviour and therefore the economy’s capital accumulation. 
 
Fiscal effects on the real economy 
In the most recent of a series of papers, Fehr et al (2005) bring demography (including 
immigration as well as fertility and mortality), fiscal policies (including pensions and their 
financing) and the economy (saving and labour supply decisions by forward looking 
consumers) together in a general equilibrium model incorporating the USA, the EU, Japan 
and China. While the foundation of this model rests on many assumptions, it indicates some 
of the most important channels of interaction that need to be considered when assessing the 
implications of population ageing, whatever one thinks about its particular assumptions. Their 
simulations illustrate the potentially important role of international capital markets in 
moderating the impacts of ageing. Without high-saving China in the model, capital 
accumulation in the three other developed economies is much slower and there is virtually no 
increase in real wages up to 2030. Looking beyond 2030, there tends to be capital 
‘shallowing’ (rather than deepening) and a small decline in real wages due to the high tax 
burden to finance the elderly population. When China is included in their model, even a China 
which gradually adopts Western spending habits, it is such a source of capital that capital 
deepening and real wage growth occurs over the next 25 years in all four regions, despite the 
rising burden of taxation to pay for pensions and health care. While only suggestive, these 
simulations underline the fact that population ageing and reactions to it are a world 
phenomenon, albeit with variation among countries in changes in the age distribution and in 
other parameters affecting economic decisions. 
 
Policies related to human capital formation cannot be addressed in the framework of Fehr et 
al (2005) because it assumes exogenous changes in productivity of people’s time—there is no 
explicit link between government investment in education or parents’ investment in their 
children and these children’s wages when they become part of the working population.  
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 After 2005 it is assume to increase with productivity growth, like other expenditure per beneficiary. 
12
 Of the 32% increase in income taxes, a 21% rise is needed to cover the increase in non-contributory 
benefits and 11% to cover the increase in health care spending. 
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The next section suggests that the young adults coming of age now and in future years may 
have less invested in their human capital than in the past because of the instability of families. 
Larger transfers of resources from today’s working population to investment in children could 
facilitate the future payment of these workers’ pensions by expanding the resource base for 
paying them. It is analogous to an increase in current taxes to help fund future expenditure, 
with the investment being in human rather than physical capital. 
 
5. Investing in children 
 
The number of children over the coming years depends very much on the evolution of fertility 
over these years, and the projected numbers reflect assumptions about it.13 The focus of my 
discussion is not on the numbers but on how the changes in the dynamics of family formation 
and dissolution discussed earlier affect children. 
 
The key aspect of these dynamics is partnership dissolution. Parents are likely to continue to 
care about the welfare of their children after they split up, and so expenditure on children, 
such as investment in their human capital, is a ‘public good’ to the parents. When living 
together, they tend to choose the efficient level of this public good, because of repeated 
interaction between parents within the same household. But after breaking up, the mother 
usually obtains custody of the children and she decides the level of expenditure on children 
(Weiss and Willis, 1985). The father can only influence it by making transfers to the mother, 
because the father cannot usually monitor the division of his transfer between expenditure on 
children and the mother’s consumption, particularly expenditure on young children. The 
father must transfer more than £1 to obtain £1 more expenditure on children, because the 
mother spends part of the transfer on herself. This higher effective price for child expenditure 
when divorced encourages him to spend less on children after divorce (perhaps nothing), 
resulting in a lower, inefficient level of expenditure on children overall. The inefficiency 
arises because the mother does not take into account the effect of her choices on the welfare 
of the father. The probability that a couple divorces is itself inversely related to this efficiency 
loss from divorce, and so parents with low education and incomes, who are expected to spend 
less on their children, suffer a smaller efficiency loss and so should be more likely to divorce 
(dissolve their cohabiting union), consistent with the evidence presented above in section 2. 
 
The lower expenditure of money and parental time on children in families in which the 
parents have split is likely to mean lower investment in the children’s human capital when 
they are young, which affects children’s development and achievements. This suggests that 
children who have experienced a family break-up may have lower achievements than children 
brought up in an intact family. The impact is difficult to identify because children of the type 
of parents who break-up are likely to have lower achievements anyway. For example, as we 
have seen with regard to mother’s education, single motherhood is more common among low 
educated mothers, who are likely to invest less in their children in any case. But, at least in the 
UK, there also seems to be a direct impact of single parenthood on children. Ermisch and 
Francesconi (2001) and Ermisch, Francesconi and Pevalin (2004) find, using comparisons of 
siblings (i.e. they have the same mother), that young adults who experience single parenthood 
as children, particularly during the pre-school years, have significantly lower educational 
attainments (e.g. less likely to achieve at least one A-level), with likely knock-on effects for 
future earnings and income.  
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 The principal projection has the number of children aged 0-14 rising until 2024 and then 
levelling off for a decade 
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The lone parenthood experience is also associated with a number of other disadvantageous 
outcomes for young adults, including a higher risk of unemployment, a higher risk of having a 
child before a woman’s 21st birthday, a higher chance of being a heavy smoker and higher 
likelihood of experiencing psychological distress in early adulthood. 
 
Thus, the changes in family formation and dissolution patterns that have accompanied the 
changes in fertility and the ageing of British society have been unfavourable for children born 
in recent years. Yet it is these children who increasingly will be called upon to support a 
growing retired population. 
 
6. Ageing, family formation and housing markets 
 
The most readily apparent impact of changes in the age distribution on housing markets is 
through household formation. Just over one-half of young women leave their parental home 
by their 21st birthday to form their own household (with or without a partner) or one with 
other unrelated adults.14 We have also seen that one half of women had formed a partnership 
by their 25th birthday. Figure 9 above shows the changes in the number of people moving 
through these key ages for household formation (20-24). On this basis we may expect a 
decline in household formation after 2012 because of age distribution changes, although the 
increase in the elderly population fuels growth in the number of households because there are 
more households per member of the older population (smaller household size), owing to the 
death of spouses and previous divorces. 
 
There are, of course, other developments affecting household formation, including partnership 
break-up and re-partnering. Household projections must, therefore take into account 
projections of the marital status as well as the age distribution of the population, and also 
trends in the propensity of members of particular age/marital status groups to form separate 
households. Figure 10 shows past actual changes and official projected changes in the number 
of households per annum for England. Consistent with changes in the number of persons aged 
20-24, these projections show the annual net increase in the number of household peaking 
around 2012 (i.e. during 2011-2016), but staying above the rate of growth in the number of 
households experienced during the 1990s. Within the total, single person households are 
projected to increase in importance, from 31% in 2006 to 38% in 2029. It should, however, be 
noted that actual household formation is affected by housing market conditions (e.g. house 
prices and rents, mortgage terms), and so the evolution of the number of households can 
deviate substantially from the projections. 
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 Estimates based on analysis using the BHPS and the 1958 birth cohort (NCDS). 
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The market for owner-occupied housing is influenced by when people buy their first home. 
Figure 11 shows the percentage of women (in a couple or single) who are not already 
homeowners who become homeowners at each age—the ‘hazard rate’ of entering owner-
occupation (e.g. 13% of women who are not homeowners when aged 28 become homeowner 
when they are 29). This entry rate rises steeply up to the age of 29 and then declines.15 
Changes in the number of people aged 25-29 should, therefore, be indicative of the changing 
volume of first-time homebuyers. Figure 9 shows that this age group increases in size up to 
2017, putting upward pressure on demand in the first-time buyers’ segment of the housing 
market. 
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 As a consequence of this pattern, 73% of British women aged 34-36 were homeowners during 2004- 
2006 (according to the BHPS), rising to 81% for those aged 43-45 and levelling off after that. 
Figure 11: Per cent of Women who Become Homeowners by Age, Great Britain (BHPS), 1992-2006
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The housing market is not only affected by scale (the number of households) but by 
‘turnover’ in household ‘types’. Turnover is influenced by family formation (e.g. fertility) and 
dissolution (e.g. divorce) as well as by changes in households’ economic circumstances (e.g. 
changes in household income). A helpful framework for analysing how these might affect the 
housing market is provided by a model in which imperfect information makes it necessary for 
households to search for a dwelling that meets their needs. For example, assume that there are 
two types of household (e.g. couples and families), and two types of house (e.g. small and 
large). Households are ‘matched’ when they reside in the appropriate type of house (e.g. 
couples in a small house). When children arrive, a couple becomes a family and when the 
leave they revert to a couple. These family formation and dissolution events can be viewed as 
causing changes in household type and the need to search for a new dwelling of the 
appropriate type. More generally, changes in a household’s economic circumstances also 
affect the ‘type’ of housing demanded. 
 
Such a search model can be used here to explore how the rate at which such changes in 
household type occur (call it β) can be expected to affect key housing market variables like 
house prices, the proportion of households searching and expected time to sell. Comparing 
steady-states with different values of β, a higher β means that there are more people searching 
relative to vacancies, which increases the rate at which vacant houses sell and shortens the 
expected time to sell. But there are also smaller gains to search, because it is more likely that 
a household returns to the matched state (e.g. because of a change in household income) when 
β is higher. This lowers search effort, which in turn reduces the rate at which households are 
matched to appropriate houses, and this operates to reduce the probability of sale (increase the 
expected time to sell). Wheaton (1990) shows that under plausible assumptions, the former 
effect is more powerful, so that a higher β increases the rate at which houses sell. 
 
How does this affect house prices? In this matching model, it is plausible to assume that 
buyers and sellers have equal bargaining power and will split the gain from each transaction, 
and this split determines the price of a house. For a given probability of sale, a higher β tends 
to lower house prices by reducing the buyer’s gain from purchase, because it is more likely 
that things will change in the future so that he can give up searching. But a higher probability 
of sale raises house prices by increasing the net gains to a house purchaser. Wheaton (1990) 
shows that although higher β reduces house prices for a given rate of sale, the increase in the 
latter associated with a higher β dominates under plausible assumptions, and so house prices 
tend to rise with β. This suggests that, by increasing the rate of change in the demand for 
different types of house, a higher rate of family formation/dissolution could raise house 
prices, and Wheaton’s simulations suggest that this effect could be substantial. 
 
I use the BHPS to examine the extent to which the arrival of a child affects a person’s demand 
for housing. First, we study whether this event stimulates a residential move, and whether it 
encourages a change in housing tenure. Then, among owners, we investigate the effect of 
childbirth on the change in housing consumption, as measured by the change in the real value 
of the house in which they live. 
 
Focussing on women aged under 45, 21% moved house if they had a child during the year 
compared with 14.8% if they did not have a child. Among women who were not homeowners 
in the previous year, 11.2% became an owner if they had a child compared with 7.8% if they 
did not. These comparisons do not control for other factors influencing the odds of residential 
movement and entry to owner-occupation, such as age and education. 
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When we control for household income, age, whether or not the woman is a homeowner, 
whether or not she lives with parents, her educational qualifications, the  presence of a 
partner, the numbers of children of different ages, length of time in her current residence and 
the real house price in the region in which she lived, having a child increases the odds of 
moving house in the coming year by 18%.16 With the same controls other than residential 
tenure and restricting the sample to women who were not owners in the previous year, the 
odds of becoming a homeowner increase by30% in the year a child is born. Among women 
who were owners before and after a residential move, those having a child increase their real 
house value by 14%, controlling for age, changes in the real house price index and changes in 
real household income. 
 
This evidence suggests a strong impact of fertility on residential movement, entry to owner-
occupation and the demand for housing among homeowners. The rise in fertility since 2002 
is, therefore, likely to have played some part in the rise in UK house prices in recent years, 
albeit a small part relative to the impact of expectations of future house price increases. 
Furthermore, sustained higher fertility raises house prices by promoting turnover in the 
housing market. 
 
Partnership formation also promotes housing market turnover. Focussing on women aged 
under 45 with a partner in the previous year, analogous multivariate analysis indicates that 
forming a partnership (marriage or cohabiting union) increases the odds of moving house by a 
multiple of 6, and among those who were not homeowners in the previous year, it increases 
the odds of becoming one by a factor of nearly 13. Thus, it appears that the formation of first 
partnerships, encouraged by the increase over the next decade in persons in their 20s, and re-
partnering after partnership dissolution puts upward pressure on house prices. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Population ageing reduces the working population relative to the number of pensions by one-
third over next 30 years. The challenge presented by this development is how best to support 
pensioners’ incomes without suppressing the net incomes of the working population and 
capital accumulation too much. The ability of private savings and occupational pensions to 
meet this challenge is doubtful. There is a related issue of inter-generational equity: how do 
we share the burden of population ageing between generations, rather than passing it on to 
future generations. Given the uncertainty about future demographic and economic 
developments, it is important to have adaptable or self-correcting policies to address 
population ageing. 
 
In contrast to exploring the economic effects of the steady fall in the aged support ratio, the 
previous section has demonstrated the more complicated effects of demographic changes on 
the housing market arising from fluctuations in the numbers in key ages and in family 
formation. Here we have seen the importance of the level of contemporary demographic rates, 
such as fertility, partnership formation and divorce, on turnover in the housing market, with 
consequences for the level of house prices. This is in addition to the ‘scale effects’ of age 
distribution changes on the number of households. 
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 The real house price is the Halifax (existing home) house price index relative to the RPI the region 
the person lived in the previous year (i.e. before any move). If we do not control for the potentially 
endogenous residential tenure, a childbirth increases the odds of a move by 28%. 
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Scotland’s Demographic Dilemma1 
 
Katerina Lisenkova and Robert E. Wright 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In terms of population size, Scotland is a small “country” when compared to most other 
countries in Europe (see Lisenkova and Wright, 2005). According to the most recent estimate, 
the population of Scotland numbered just over 5.14 million in 2007. This represents about 8.5 
per cent of the total population of the United Kingdom. Where Scotland differs to most high-
income countries is in the shape of the time path followed to reach this total. This is shown in 
Figure 1. The figure shows the size of the Scottish population beginning in the mid-1800s. 
The population of Scotland grew steadily in most of the first 100 years of this period. 
However after the Second World War, the size of the population has changed little and has 
hovered around the five million mark (see Figure 2). 
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1
 Some of the research included in this report has been carried out with Cher Li, Peter McGregor, Irene Mosca, 
Nikos Pappas, Kim Swales and Karen Turner. However, the author takes full responsibility for all errors, 
omissions and shortcomings associated with the way in which this research has been used. 
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This pattern of “demographic stagnation” is not typical of other high-income countries. To put 
the Scottish experience in a more comparative perspective, Figure 3 shows the change in 
population size for selected countries/groups of countries on a comparative basis since 1950. 
This is achieved by indexing population size to the common standard of 100 in 1950. The 
comparators include the “high immigration” countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
USA; the 15 countries that were member-states of the European Union (EU-15) prior to 
enlargement in 2004; the eight central and eastern European countries (A-8) that joined in the 
European Union in 2004; and Ireland, a country to which Scotland (rightly or wrongly) is 
often compared. As the figure suggests, most of these countries experienced what can be 
termed “steady” population growth in this period. The possible exception to this is Ireland, 
where the population growth was concentrated in the second half of this period. 
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One issue that is of increasing concern in many high-income countries (including Scotland) is 
that population growth in the future is expected to be negative, which will lead to population 
decline. In fact (as discussed below) there are numerous countries whose populations are 
already declining. The populations of these countries are also expected to “age” rapidly in the 
future. Population ageing is the process by which an increasing share of the total population is 
concentrated in the older age groups. It is the decrease in the number and share of “younger” 
people coupled with the increase in the number and share of “older” people in the population. 
It is often measured by the change in the average or median age of the population. It is 
important to note that population ageing is a global issue. According to the United Nations 
(2005), there are only 18 “outlier” countries, where currently population ageing is not 
occurring. However, this being said, there is considerable cross-country variation in the speed 
at which population ageing is expected to proceed in the future. 
 
2. Should We Be Concerned With Population Decline and Population Ageing?  
 
In our view, the answer is clearly “yes”. There is a well established and growing literature 
concerned with the negative economic consequences of population decline and population 
ageing (see for example, Clark et al, 2004 and Weil, 1997 for excellent reviews). For 
example, research has considered the impact of population ageing and population growth on 
key labour market variables such as productivity, earnings, employment, unemployment, 
mobility, migration, retirement and educational participation. Likewise, serious attention has 
been directed towards evaluating the effects on savings, consumption, investment, housing 
and intergenerational transfers (the exchange of resources in terms of money and between 
children, parents and grandparents). There is also agreement that demographic change of this 
type will impinge on the labour market (see Borsch-Supan, 2003; Wright, 2004b; Wright, 
R.E. and K. Lisenkova, 2007; Wright, 2002b, 2004b). Although it would be incorrect to 
conclude that all aspects of population decline and population ageing are negative, there are 
ultimately going to be some sizeable economic costs. 
 
With population aging there will be an increase in the number of people of “pension age” (say 
for example, age 65 and older). This could be coupled with a decrease in the number of 
people of working age. As the aged 65+ group grows, the demand for state-supplied health 
and personal care, residential services, housing, pensions and other services consumed by this 
group increases. Unfortunately at the same time, the base expected to pay for this increase—
essentially people of working age who are employed—may become progressively smaller in 
both absolute numbers and in relative population share. In Scotland, for example, about 95 
per cent of total employment is concentrated in the 20 to 64 age range. It is not difficult to 
conclude that such a situation of increasing imbalance is not sustainable indefinitely into the 
future (see Wright, 2002a, 2004a). 
 
On a positive note, a smaller population (given a constant level of consumption per head) 
should put less pressure on the environment. With the population ageing, the number of 
people in the younger age groups declines. Part of this decline will be a reduction in the 
number of children of school age. If government expenditure per head remains constant, total 
expenditure on primary and secondary schooling should decline. The same will be the case 
for tertiary education if participation rates do not increase. Older workers are an important 
source of volunteer labour and the rate of volunteering is on the rise in many countries 
(including Scotland, see Findlay and Findlay, 2005).  
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As the population ages, and if past trends in participation continue, the amount of volunteer 
labour contributed to the economy will increase sharply. Finally, population ageing and a 
declining labour force provide incentives for governments and employers to invest more 
seriously in the education and training of the work force which should increase labour 
productivity. 
 
Arithmetic suggests that if labour force participation rates do not increase, then the numbers 
in employment will decline as the labour force gets smaller. What is required to increase 
labour force participation? Simple economics suggests that it is the interaction between labour 
demand (potential employers) and labour supply (potential employees) that determines the 
level of employment and wages paid. If the potential supply of labour decreases, this will lead 
to increased competition in the labour market (especially for younger workers) and upwards 
pressure on wages. It is important to note that this “wage effect” may also provide an 
incentive for individuals of “older” labour force age to enter, re-enter or stay in the labour 
market.  
 
However, there is little evidence to suggest that this is happening in most high income 
countries. For example, the trend in labour force participation rates of men and women aged 
55-64 has been downwards in most of these countries (see OECD, 2008). It is our view that it 
is unlikely that increases in the labour force participation rate of older individuals will 
compensate for the expected overall decrease of individuals of working age. One reason for 
this is that workers of different ages may not be necessarily good (no matter perfect) 
substitutes.  
 
If in the end producers are forced to pay higher wages because of fewer available workers, 
they will become less competitive in both domestic and international markets, which in turn 
will lead to lower rates of economic growth. For any given tax rate, lower rates of economic 
growth imply lower tax revenues. If tax revenues decline, governments will quickly find 
themselves without the necessary resources to provide the public services expected by their 
ageing electorates. However, raising taxes will exacerbate the problem of capital flight and 
the emigration of quality labour to lower tax regions, leading to even lower rates of economic 
growth.  
 
In many respects the demographic situation in Scotland is similar to many other high-income 
countries. Fertility has been below the replacement level for several decades. Mortality has 
declined steadily in the past century, with increasing life expectancy across the age range. 
However, in most of the post-war period Scotland was a “net exporter” of people with the 
flow of emigrants being considerably larger than the flow of immigrants. These trends in 
fertility mortality and net-migration have caused the population to “age” considerably since 
the peak of the baby boom in the mid-1960s.  This longer term process of population ageing 
will accelerate in the future.  These trends have established the conditions that have caused 
the population to stagnate in size in the past and have built-in the momentum for decline in 
both the population and the labour force in the future. 
 
Research by Lisenkova et al (2008) for Scotland, based on a mathematical simulation model 
of the economy, suggests adverse economic effects of labour force decline. These simulations 
indicate that output growth will be lower, employment will be lower, inflation will increase 
and competitiveness will decrease. That is, labour force decline has clear negative 
macroeconomics consequences that are by no means small in magnitude.  
 
 
 
25 
In this context, it is also worth noting that in Scotland the total population and population of 
working age has not grown much in the last five decades. One important question that this 
paper does not attempt to answer concerns whether the economic growth experience of 
Scotland over the last half century has been negatively affected by a lack of sustained 
population and labour force growth?  
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare past, current and possible future demographic trends 
in Scotland. In Section 2, past changes in the three main demographic variables—fertility, 
mortality and net-migration—are reviewed. In Section 3, population projections are carried 
out based on different assumptions relating to future levels of net-migration. These 
projections provide a quantitative description of future changes in population size and share 
of different age/sex groups. This is followed in Section 4 by a discussion of what can be done 
to lessen the negative consequences associated with population and labour force decline. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
 
3 Demographic Past 
 
It is worth describing briefly the mechanisms that cause a population to change in size. Below 
is what demographers usually refer to as the “population growth identity”: ∆N  =  B - D + I  - 
E where: "∆N" is change in population size (N); "B" is the number of births; "D" is the 
number of deaths; "I" is the number of immigrants and "E" is the number of emigrants. From 
this identity there are two ways a population can grow or decline. The first is by “natural 
increase” (B-D), which is the difference between the number of births and deaths. The second 
is by “net-migration” (I - E), which is the difference between the number of immigrants and 
emigrants. Therefore, it is necessary to examine past trends in fertility, mortality and net-
migration in order to understand the current demographic situation. 
 
3.1 Fertility 
Figure 4 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) for Scotland for the period 1945 to 2007. This 
“period” measure of fertility summarises the number of children that a woman would be 
expected to have if she moved through the child-bearing ages of 15 to 49 bearing children at 
the rates that prevail in any particular year. Also shown in this figure is the so-called 
“replacement level” of fertility, which is approximately 2.1 live births per woman. This is the 
level of fertility required so that the number of births equals the number of deaths and 
population size will remain constant. 
 
In keeping with most other high-income countries, Scotland experienced a sharp increase in 
fertility in the 1950s and 1960s. In these so-called “baby boom’ years, fertility was well above 
the replacement level, with the TFR peaking at around 3.2 births per woman in 1965. 
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However, since then the trend has been downwards with periodic short-lived upturns. More 
importantly, since 1975, fertility has been below the replacement level. The most recent 
(2007) estimate of the TFR is 1.74 births, which is about 20 per cent below the replacement 
level. It is also worth noting that over the past two decades the TFR in Scotland has been 
below that for the United Kingdom as a whole and is currently the lowest of the four countries 
that make up the United Kingdom (see GROS, 2008). As is shown in Table 1, however a TFR 
of 1.74 is relative high by European standard. For example, the average TFR for the 27 
member-states that make up the European Union is 1.51 births per woman. 
 
Fertility is now below the so-called replacement-level of 2.1 births per woman in all European 
countries (see Table 1). In many of these countries fertility has been below the replacement-
level for up to four decades (see Table 2). According to these estimates, Croatia was the first 
European country to reach replacement level fertility in 1967 and Albania was the last to 
reach it in 2004. Therefore, the “duration” of below replacement-level fertility varies 
considerably across European countries and this variation impacts on the “rates” at which 
these countries have aged in the past and will age in the future. 
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Table.1  
Total Fertility Rate 
European Countries, c. 2006 
Country    
Iceland 2.07 
France 1.98 
Norway 1.90 
Ireland 1.88 
Denmark 1.85 
Sweden 1.85 
United Kingdom 1.85 
Finland 1.84 
Albania 1.73 
Belgium 1.73 
Netherlands 1.71 
Luxembourg 1.70 
Montenegro 1.64 
Estonia 1.55 
Macedonia 1.45 
Switzerland 1.44 
Serbia 1.43 
Channel Islands 1.42 
Austria 1.41 
Malta 1.40 
Bulgaria 1.38 
Croatia 1.38 
Greece 1.38 
Latvia 1.36 
Portugal 1.36 
Spain 1.36 
Hungary 1.35 
Italy 1.35 
Germany 1.34 
Czech Republic 1.33 
Slovenia 1.32 
Romania 1.31 
Lithuania 1.30 
Russian Federation 1.30 
Belarus 1.29 
Poland 1.27 
Ukraine 1.25 
Slovakia 1.24 
Moldova 1.22 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 1.18 
Europe Average 1.51 
 
Source: World Bank (2008)
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Table.2 
Year Reached and Duration of Below Replacement-level Fertility 
European Countries 
Country   Year replacement level 
fertility reached 
Number of years 
fertility below 
replacement level 
Croatia 1967 41 
Finland 1968 40 
Channel Islands 1969 39 
Denmark 1969 39 
Luxembourg 1969 39 
Germany 1970 38 
Switzerland 1970 38 
Belgium 1972 36 
Ukraine 1972 36 
Austria 1973 35 
Netherlands 1973 35 
United Kingdom 1973 35 
France 1975 33 
Norway 1975 33 
Italy 1977 31 
Hungary 1978 30 
Slovenia 1979 29 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 1980 28 
Bulgaria 1980 28 
Czech Republic 1980 28 
Greece 1981 27 
Spain 1981 27 
Portugal 1983 25 
Belarus 1985 23 
Macedonia 1986 22 
Lithuania 1988 20 
Latvia 1989 19 
Montenegro 1989 19 
Poland 1989 19 
Russian Federation 1989 19 
Slovakia 1989 19 
Estonia 1990 18 
Romania 1990 18 
Ireland 1991 17 
Sweden 1992 16 
Moldova 1993 15 
Iceland 1997 11 
Malta 1997 11 
Albania 2004 4 
Serbia N/A N/A 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
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3.2 Mortality 
Figure 5 shows life-expectancy at birth for women and men in the period 1951 to 2007. In 
1951, life expectancy at birth was 68.7 years for women and 64.4 years for men. By 2007, it 
had risen to 79.7 years for women and 74.8 years for men, which is lower than in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Despite this apparent progress, Scotland has not done well when 
compared to other high income countries. When compared to other European countries, 
Scotland is a mortality laggard. 
Figure 5
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The current level of female life-expectancy is about the same as in the Czech Republic (see 
Table 3). Likewise, the current level of male life-expectancy is similar to Slovenia. It is 
important to stress that Scotland’s mortality is excessively high. That is, it should be much 
lower given levels of income, education, public services, etc. One view is that this is caused 
by poor “life style” choices, reflected in high levels of alcohol consumption, smoking 
behaviour and drug use coupled with a bad diet. In addition, Scotland does not compare well 
when it comes to death due to violence and accidents (particularly amongst young men). It is 
also safe to conclude that closing the mortality gap with other countries will be a major public 
health challenge. 
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Table 3 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
European Countries, c. 2006 
Country Female  Country Male 
France 84.1  Iceland 79.4 
Spain 84.1  Switzerland 79.1 
Switzerland 84.0  Sweden 78.7 
Italy 84.0  Italy 78.3 
Iceland 83.0  Norway 78.1 
Sweden 82.9  Spain 77.7 
Finland 82.8  Netherlands 77.6 
Austria 82.7  France 77.2 
Norway 82.7  Austria 77.1 
Belgium 82.4  Ireland 77.1 
Luxembourg 82.3  United Kingdom 77.0 
Germany 82.0  Cyprus 77.0 
Greece 82.0  Greece 77.0 
Netherlands 81.9  Belgium 76.7 
Ireland 81.8  Malta 76.5 
Portugal 81.8  Channel Islands 76.5 
Cyprus 81.7  Germany 76.4 
Slovenia 81.4  Luxembourg 76.2 
United Kingdom 81.3  Denmark 75.9 
Channel Islands 81.3  Finland 75.8 
Malta 80.7  Portugal 75.2 
Denmark 80.4  Slovenia 74.1 
Czech Republic 79.7  Czech Republic 73.5 
Poland 9.6  Albania 73.3 
Albania 79.6  Croatia 72.5 
Croatia 79.3  Montenegro 72.2 
Slovak Republic 78.2  Bosnia/Herzegovina 72.0 
Estonia 78.1  Macedonia 71.7 
Hungary 77.4  Poland 70.9 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 77.3  Slovak Republic 70.4 
Lithuania 77.1  Serbia 70.2 
Montenegro 76.7  Bulgaria 69.1 
Latvia 76.5  Hungary 69.0 
Macedonia 76.4  Romania 68.7 
Bulgaria 76.3  Estonia 67.3 
Romania 75.8  Latvia 65.5 
Serbia 75.5  Lithuania 65.3 
Belarus 74.5  Moldova 65.0 
Ukraine 74.1  Belarus 63.0 
Russian Federation 72.5  Ukraine 62.3 
Moldova 72.3  Russian Federation 58.9 
Europe Average 79.7  Europe average 73.1 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
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3.3 Net-migration 
Figure 6 shows the trend in net-migration in Scotland for the period 1951-2007. Throughout 
most of this period, the number of emigrants was larger than the number of immigrants, 
leading to population loss. In this period, net-migration loss was over 800,000 people. This is 
a staggering figure when one remembers that in this period the total population averaged just 
above 5 million people. Such an intensity of out-migration occurred in very few countries in 
the same period, with Ireland perhaps being the main exception (see Lisenkova, Mosca and 
Wright, 2008). However, over time, the gap between immigration and emigration has 
gradually closed and the 1990s was a period of relative balance. Indeed, since 2000, 
immigration has exceeded emigration, and for the first time in Scottish history, the country 
has had five years in a row of positive net-migration. More specifically, in the period 2001-
2007, net-migration flows numbered over +100,000 people. 
 
 
Figure 6
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4. Demographic Futures? 
 
4.1 Population Projection Methodology 
 Scotland can be described as having a population with below replacement level fertility, 
gradually decreasing mortality and low (but apparently increasing) levels of net-migration. 
What will happen to the size and age structure of the Scottish population if current trends 
continue? In order to provide at best a partial answer to these questions, it is necessary to 
carry out population projections. In order to do this, assumptions relating to fertility, mortality 
and net-migration (amongst other factors) must be specified. While this, in our view, is less 
problematic for fertility and mortality, it is extremely difficult to even speculate what future 
levels of net-migration might be. It must also be remembered that population projections are 
not population “predictions”. In the past, demographers have been notoriously wrong when it 
comes to population projections (see Fleischhacker et al, 2003). However, projections are 
useful in the sense that they can provide a range of values where the true value has a high 
probability of being captured. 
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The General Register Office for Scotland (in conjunction with the Office of National 
Statistics) routinely carries out and publishes “official” population projection for Scotland. 
The most recent set of projections are “2006-based”, which implies that the first projection 
year is 2007 (GROS, 2007). For our purposes, these projections are not particularly well 
suited since the range of net-migration assumptions employed is rather limited. In addition, 
population totals (broken down by age and sex) along with fertility and mortality levels are 
now known for 2007.  
 
Given that future levels of net-migration are a big unknown, a series of population projections 
with the base-year 2007 are included in this paper. These projections incorporate a wide range 
of net-migration assumptions. The assumptions relating to fertility and mortality are however 
similar to those used in   2006-based GROS “official” population projections, with key 
assumptions relating to fertility and mortality being updated. Because of space constraints, no 
attempt is made in this paper to explore alternative mortality and fertility assumptions. 
However, projections along these lines can be found in Lisenkova et al (2008) and will be 
briefly discussed below. The main fertility assumption is that the TFR decreases slightly to 
1.65 births per woman in the early period of the projection and stays at this level until 2051. 
With respect to mortality, the main assumption is that male/female life expectancy at birth 
gradually increases in an almost linear manner to 82.9/87.0 years by 2051.The projection 
technique used is the “cohort component” method, which is the same as used in the official 
population projections (see Hinde, 1998). The span of the projection is just less than 4½ 
decades. The base-year is 2007 and the end-year is 2051, with the first projected year being 
2008.  
 
The projections begin with the assumption of zero net-migration. This projection provides a 
useful “baseline” since it provides information on how the size and age/sex structure of the 
population will be shaped by fertility and mortality (i.e. natural change). It should be stressed 
that this does not mean that there is an expectation of zero net-migration in the future.  
 
In the other projections it is assumed that the levels of net-migration range from +10,000 to 
+50,000 people per year. It is assumed that all migrants are less than age 40. Of this total, 25 
per cent are less than age 15. The sex ratio is assumed to be balanced at 50:50. These 
assumptions reflect the reality that most migrants are relatively young with the majority being 
of labour force age. This assumed age structure can also be thought of as the outcome of 
having a successful immigration policy/system that targets/attracts young workers with 
children. 
 
4.2. Zero Net-migration Projection 
Under the assumption of zero net-migration, the projection suggests that the Scottish 
population will decrease in size in the future. This is shown in Figure 7, which shows 
population size from 1951 onwards, with the post-2007 totals coming from the projection. If 
these projections prove to be correct, the population will decline from the current level of 
round 5.1 million to 4.7 million by 2051, which represents a decrease of nearly 8.5 per cent 
(see Table 4). The decline is even more pronounced for the population aged 20-64. This is 
shown in Figure 8. Currently there are about 3.1 million people in this age group. The zero 
net-migration suggests that this group will decrease to 2.4 million, which represents a decline 
of around 23 per cent. Such a decline implies that the share of the total population in this age 
range will fall from about 61 per cent to 47 per cent in this period. 
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Table 4 
Age Structure Estimates 
Scotland, 2007 and 2051 
(Zero Net-migration Assumption) 
  
Scotland 2007   2051     Change   
Age 
group N % share N  % share   ∆ %∆ 
0-4 275,200 5.4 203,731 4.0  -71,469 -26.0 
5-19 905,707 17.6 652,050 12.7  -253,657 -28.0 
20-64 
3,117,68
0 60.6 
2,405,80
3 46.8  -711,877 -22.8 
65+ 845,613 16.4 
1,448,96
9 28.2  +603,356 +71.4 
85+ 98,270 1.9 408,036 7.9  +309,766 +315.2 
Total 
5,144,20
0 -- 
4,710,51
3   -433,687 -8.4 
 
 
In addition to the total population and the population aged 20-64, Table 4 show estimates for 
the “0-4”, “5-19”, “65+” and “85+”age groups, implied by the zero net-migration projection. 
Examining changes in the younger and older age groups presented in this table, it is not 
difficult to conclude that the Scottish population will age rapidly in the future, as the 
projection suggests a sizeable shift in population age structure away from the younger to older 
age groups. 
 
 
Figure 7
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Figure 8
Population Aged 20-64
Scotland and Ireland, 1951-2051
(Zero Net-migration Assumption)
2,000,000
2,100,000
2,200,000
2,300,000
2,400,000
2,500,000
2,600,000
2,700,000
2,800,000
2,900,000
3,000,000
3,100,000
3,200,000
1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
Nu
m
be
r 
o
f p
e
o
pl
e
 
 
 
There will be a sizeable decrease of around 26 per cent in the number of pre-school age 
children (approximated by the 0-4 age group). Likewise there will be a slightly larger 
decrease of 28 per cent in the number of school age children and young adults (5-19 age 
group). The projection suggests that the number of people of “pension age” (65+ age group) 
will increase by over 70 per cent. Likewise the number of “frail elderly” (85+) will increase 
by over 300 per cent. If these projections turn out to be correct, then the ratio of older to 
younger people (65+/0-19) will change from 80:100 to 210:100 by 2051. 
 
4.3 Positive Net-migration Projections 
It seems unlikely that net-migration will be zero in the future. However, it is very difficult to 
estimate future net-migration levels since levels of immigration are very much driven by 
policy in those countries that have managed immigration system.   As is discussed below, a 
points-based immigration system is being currently be phased in. In principle, this system 
could have a significant impact on regulating immigration from countries outside the 
European Union. That is, it could be used to increase or decrease this immigration flow. 
 
This section explores the demographic consequences of various levels of net-migration 
ranging up to +50,000 per year. 50,000 net-migrants per year is about one per cent of the total 
Scottish population or about the same as the immigration targets set in Canada. It may seem 
like a large number, given negative net-migration is more typical for Scotland (see Figure 6), 
however, it is not excessively large when compared to other countries. 
 
Figure 9 shows the total size of the Scottish population for the period 1951 to 2051 based on a 
net-migration of zero, +10,000, +20,000, +30,000, +40,000 and +50,000 per year. The graph 
suggests that a net-migration of between +20,000 and +30,000 per year is required (year on 
year) to prevent the population declining below the 5 million mark.  As Figure 10 shows, a 
net-migration of between +20,000 and +30,000 per year is also needed to stop the population 
aged 20-64 from shrinking. Values above +30,000 per year will make both the total 
population and population aged 20-64 increase in the future. With a net-migration of +50,000 
per year, the Scottish population would grow by about 1 million per decade over the next four 
decades. The estimates illustrate the importance of being able to attract migrants who are 
predominately of labour force age. 
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Figure 9
Population  Size
Scotland, 1951-2051
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Figure 10
Population Aged 20-64
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration Assumptions)
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Figures 11-14 show similar graphs for the other age groups considered above. Since we 
assume that migrants are young and that the sex ratio is balanced, increases in net-migration 
will help slow down, and perhaps turnaround, the decline in the number of young people. It is 
also assumed that migrants will have children at the rates specified in the fertility assumption 
described above.  
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Figure 11
Population Aged  0-4
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration  Assumptions)
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Figure 12
Population Aged  5-19
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration  Assumptions
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This is a conservative assumption in the sense that immigrants tend to have a fertility rate that 
is on average higher than the native-born population for at least one generation. In this sense, 
estimates of the population aged 0-4 and 5-19 shown in Figures 11 and 12, respectively, are 
likely to be underestimates. Anyway, the projections suggest that if net-migration was 
+50,000 per year, the numbers in both these age groups would increase. The difference is 
sizeable—almost double of what is expected in the case of zero net-migration. 
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Figure 13
Population Aged 65+
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration Assumptions)
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The other end of the age distribution is shown in Figures 12 and 13, which show the 
projection estimates for the 65+ and 85+ age groups. It is clearly the case that migrants age in 
the same sense as native-born individuals. However, we assume that all the migrants are less 
than age 40. In this sense they only start entering the older age groups near the end of the 
projection period. For example, someone aged 40 in 2007, will turn 65 in 2032. Likewise, the 
same individual will only turn 85 in 2052. It is therefore not surprising that different net-
migration levels do not have much impact on the numbers in these age groups in the 
projection period that ends in 2051. 
 
 
 
Figure 14
Population Aged 85+
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration Assumptions)
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Figure 15
Share of Total Population Aged 20-64
Scotland, 1951-2051
(Different Net-migration Assumptions)
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Finally, Figure 15 shows the percentage of the total population in the 20-64 age group. This is 
a measure of the labour force’s share of the total population. What is interesting about this 
graph is that despite quite a wide range of net-migration assumptions, this share does not vary 
much—from 51 per cent in 2051 under zero net-migration to 57 per cent when net-migration 
is +50,000 per year. In addition, for all values of net-migration, the slope is downwards. This 
is indicative evidence of the considerable amount of momentum towards population decline 
and rapid population ageing currently “built-in” to the Scottish population. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Implications for Policy 
 
The population projections suggest that any future growth in the potential supply of labour in 
Scotland will almost exclusively be driven by future levels of net-migration. The data 
suggests that much of the increase in net-migration in the last few years in Scotland has been 
caused by higher levels of international immigration. Much of this increase in immigration is 
from the so-called A8 countries, which joined the European Union in 2004 (see Wright, 
2008).  Although immigration from these countries has increased sharply, the largest group of 
immigrants are still from Commonwealth countries, mainly the so-called New 
Commonwealth countries of the Indian sub-continent. 
 
A key question concerns whether this atypically high level of immigration from A8 countries 
(and particularly from Poland) will continue in to the future and for how long. There is some 
evidence that the bulk of immigration from A8 countries is short-term in nature with large 
numbers of immigrants returning to their country of origin within two years (see Wright, 
2008). Evidence from the A8 Workers Registration Scheme, large government surveys (such 
as the Labour Force Survey), small-scale surveys carried out by local governments and 
anecdotal evidence (such a newspaper reports and interviews) all suggest that immigration is 
decreasing and emigration is increasing. In addition, there are restrictions on the free 
movement of labour from A8 countries to the “old 15 EU states” (most notably Germany). 
That is, nationals from these countries do not have an “automatic” right to work in all EU 
countries.  
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We believe that these restrictions have been a factor contributing to the high levels of A8 
immigration to Scotland (and to the UK generally). For many A8 immigrants, Scotland is 
simply not their “first choice” destination country. When (if) these restrictions are relaxed, it 
is likely that many A8 nationals who immigrated to Scotland will move to these countries. 
One obvious example of where this is likely to happen is in Germany where there is already a 
large Polish immigrant population, and despite restrictions, a continued legal flow of Polish 
migrants.  More generally, immigration from A8 countries is not a long-term solution to 
Scotland’s demographic deficit. The populations and labour forces of all these countries are 
declining and there is not an unlimited pool of people wanting to emigrate to other countries.  
 
If Scotland is to maintain the levels of net-migration implied by the population projections, an 
immigration system is required that will allow Scotland to attract new migrants. However, in 
the United Kingdom matters relating to immigration are a “reserved power”. That is, 
responsibility lies with the central government in London and not with devolved 
administrations (such as the Scottish Parliament). In this respect, there is nothing in the 
Canadian-like “points-based” immigration system being currently phased in to manage 
immigration at the UK-level that plays to Scotland’s advantage. There is nothing in this new 
system that explicitly takes into consideration the fact that demographic needs differ across 
regions in the UK. This is in sharp contrast to the Canadian (and to a lesser extent the 
Australian) immigration systems, where more points are awarded and/or lower points 
thresholds are applied if immigrants agree to live, work and stay for a minimum period of 
time in a particularly region (i.e. provinces/territories in the case of Canada and 
states/territories in the case of Australia).  
 
It is also important to remember that migration is potentially endogenous in the sense that 
increasing wages should increase immigration and decrease emigration. Lisenkova, et al 
(2008) attempt to “endogenise migration” by adopting the standard Harris and Todaro view 
that migration is positively related to the real wage differential, and negatively to the 
unemployment rate differential. This work is at a preliminary stage, but it does appear that 
“endogenous migration” does not generate a net-migration flow large enough to seriously 
curb the negative macroeconomic impacts reported above. That is, even though endogenous 
migration does “help” it is not in itself “the solution” to the problem. 
 
Although managed immigration is important, it is not the only policy that should be pursued. 
In fact there are a range of policies that complement each other. The key is to introduce 
policies that increase the potential supply of labour available to employers but these policies 
must not put upwards pressure on wages, and such policies should be seriously pursued in 
Scotland. The first is that the government and the private sector should be prepared to 
subsidise female employment through “family friendly policies” (such as free day care), 
which will increase the employment rate of women who have children (especially children of 
pre-school age).  
40 
Figure 16
Full-time Employment Rates
Women Aged 20-49 
Scotland, 1992-2008 
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The employment rate of women with children in Scotland is very low, and has not changed 
much in the last two decades. This is especially the case for full-time employment. This is 
shown in Figure 16, which gives the full-time employment rate of women with and without 
children. Women with children of pre-school age have a full-time employment rate of 20 per 
cent. 
 
The second policy implication relates to education. Education policy and the education 
system must be made more attuned to the demands of the labour market.  There has been a 
large increase in the proportion and number of young people in higher education. 
Participation rates in higher education are much higher than in the other countries of the 
United Kingdom. Much of this expansion has been at the expense of further education.  
Evidence suggests that a large share of graduates end up in non-graduate jobs. At the same 
time, there is a shortage of individuals with middle-level skills (i.e. those skills that are 
generated through further education and work-led training programmes). Also recent evidence 
suggests that over-education and skill miss-match are factors contributing to high rates of 
emigration of Scottish-domiciled higher education graduates (Faggian, Li and Wright, 2008). 
 
The third policy is that public sector employment should be reduced to allow for the 
productivity gains associated with the provision of public services by the private sector (see 
Armstrong, 2008). There is a (not unanimous) view that public sector employment is too high 
in Scotland. We believe there is a mindset amongst politicians and the general public that 
public services must be provided by public employees. As the potential labour force declines, 
labour becomes more valuable and it must be employed in sectors with the highest 
productivity.  If the private sector can provide public services of a given quality for a lower 
cost, then they should be encouraged and allowed to do so. 
 
It is also worth noting that increases in fertility and decreases in mortality will also affect the 
size of the potential labour forces. In addition, there is a strong link between mortality, 
morbidity and ill-health. Therefore, as mortality declines labour productively should also 
increase and work absenteeism should fall because of improved health. Lisenkova et al (2008) 
examined the impact that different mortality levels would have on the size of the potential 
labour force. They carried out population projections based on a both “high” and “low” life 
expectancy assumptions, which represent a wide range of possible future values for both men 
and women.  
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Essentially, the “low” assumption implies Scotland falling still further behind Europe (and the 
UK). On the other hand, the “high” assumption implies a gradual catching up. The main 
finding was that these alternative mortality assumptions had little effect on the size of the 
population aged 20-64, relative to the baseline mortality assumptions described above. 
 
The fertility rate in Scotland is relatively high when compared to most countries in Europe. 
Since low fertility is the main cause of population ageing and population decline, increasing 
fertility should at least slow both of these processes. While this is clearly true, any increase in 
fertility will only impact on the size of the labour force 15-20 years later, as those new-born 
individuals grow-up into workers. To explore this effect more formally, Lisenkova et al 
(2008) carried out population projections based on different fertility assumptions. This 
analysis suggested that the increase in fertility needed to reverse labour force decline is very 
large and this increase would need to occur in a very short period of time. More generally, 
this work suggests that even a very large (and unlikely) increase in fertility will not generate a 
sizable increase in the potential labour force in the next four and a half decades. 
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Table.5 
Year Total Population and Population Aged 15-64 Started to Decline 
or Year Expected to Start to Decline 
European Countries 
Country Total  Country Aged 20-
64 
Hungary 1981  Bulgaria 1986 
Bulgaria 1989  Macedonia 1989 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 1990  Belarus 1990 
Croatia 1991  Bosnia/Herzegovina 1991 
Czech Republic 1991  Croatia 1991 
Estonia 1991  Estonia 1991 
Latvia 1991  Latvia 1991 
Romania 1991  Lithuania 1992 
Albania 1992  Albania 1993 
Lithuania 1992  Ukraine 1993 
Slovenia 1992  Serbia 1995 
Moldova 1993  Italy 1997 
Russian Federation 1993  Germany 1998 
Belarus 1994  Romania 2000 
Ukraine 1994  Montenegro 2000 
Serbia 1996  Poland 2001 
Poland 1999  Russian Federation 2001 
Slovakia 2000  Hungary 2003 
Montenegro 2000  Moldova 2004 
Germany 2004  Netherlands 2004 
Macedonia 2010  Czech Republic 2005 
Italy 2012  Slovenia 2006 
Portugal 2015  Denmark 2007 
Greece 2017  Channel Islands 2010 
Channel Islands 2020  Finland 2010 
Finland 2028  Greece 2010 
Malta 2030  Malta 2010 
Austria 2032  Slovakia 2010 
Denmark 2032  Belgium 2010 
Belgium 2033  Spain 2011 
Netherlands 2040  Portugal 2011 
Spain 2040  France 2011 
France > 2050  Austria 2012 
Iceland > 2050  Switzerland 2015 
Ireland > 2050  Iceland 2026 
Luxembourg > 2050  Ireland 2040 
Norway > 2050  Luxembourg > 2050 
Sweden > 2050  Norway > 2050 
Switzerland > 2050  Sweden > 2050 
United Kingdom > 2050  United Kingdom > 2050 
 
Source: World Bank (2008), United Nations (2007) 
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In closing, it is worth reminding the reader that Scotland is not the only country facing 
population and labour force decline. However, there is considerable cross-country variation in 
this respect. Some evidence of this considerable variation for European countries is shown in 
Table 5. This table gives the year the total population and the population aged 20-64 started to 
decline or is expected to start to decline based on World Bank population data (World Bank, 
2008) and the most-recently available set of United Nations population projections (United 
Nations, 2007). Figures 17 and 18 show the percentage declines for European countries based 
on these projections. This information suggests that there are numerous countries where both 
the general population and population of labour force age are expected to decline much more 
than is likely to happen in Scotland. For example, if these projections prove to be correct, then 
the labour force will almost halve in Ukraine in the next 4 to 5 decades. 
 
Figure 17
Projected Percentage Change in Total Population
European Countries, 2005-2050
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Figure 18
Projected Percentage Change in Population Aged 20-64
European Countries, 2005-2050
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6. Conclusions 
 
What is “Scotland’s demographic dilemma”? Past trends in fertility, mortality and net-
migration have established the pre-conditions for significant population and labour force 
decline in the coming decades. Most economists and businessmen would agree that a 
shrinking labour force is not desirable. There is nothing good about having to pay people 
more, simply because there are fewer of them. Although technological change and capital 
investment are clearly important, having a growing labour force with the appropriate skill-
base is required for sustained economic growth. 
 
Given fertility has been below the replacement-level for over three decades, it seems unlikely 
that it will increase to, and stay at, the very high levels needed for sustained labour force 
growth in the long-run. Likewise, realistic improvements in mortality (remembering that 
Scotland has a long way to go in this respect) will have little impact on the overall size of the 
labour force. This suggests that without a sustained increase in net-migration, the labour force 
will shrink. The “dilemma” therefore that Scotland faces is to either grow the labour force 
through increased immigration and/or decreased emigration or face negative macroeconomic 
consequences that will likely lead to a lowering of the average standard of living.  
 
With lower economic growth, it will be more difficult to pay for population ageing. Almost 
anything is affordable with high rates of economic growth. Constraints in the labour force 
caused by demographic change will make generating high rates of economic growth very 
difficult. In this respect, it is often argued that improvements in technology and investment in 
capital will increase labour productivity and therefore lower the demand for workers. 
However, it would be pure folly to conclude than this “will happen” just because it is needed. 
One implication of this voiced by many (especially the anti-immigration lobby) is that there 
should be a “conscious effort” to move away from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
industries. The problem with this “solution” is that this is easier said than done.  
 
One view is that population ageing is not an economic problem but a political problem. In 
welfare states such as Scotland, tax-payers are required by their Governments to pay for a 
given minimum standard of living to all those who cannot achieve this for themselves. With 
population ageing this “minimum standard of living” may very well have to fall, since the 
financial requirements needed to maintain, for example, state pensions and home help at 
current levels indefinitely  are unlikely to be obtainable. However, as a population ages so 
does it electorate, and older people compared to younger people have much higher rates of 
participation in elections at all levels of government.  
 
The problem facing politicians is that if they do not—or cannot—accommodate the demands 
of their ageing electorate they will suffer dearly at the ballot box. A “greying electorate” will 
not vote in mass for politicians who they believe are ignoring their interests. At the same time, 
those politicians who promise and don’t deliver will be treated in a similar manner. Therefore, 
politicians in the main political parties will have to agree that it may not be possible to 
provide the standard of living that an increasing share of the electorate wants. In this sense, 
population ageing will force a political consensus in Scotland, which is occurring in other 
countries with rapidly ageing populations (with Germany being a good example).
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